Maintaining the Middle Path: ASEAN-Great Power Relations in a Post-Covid World

2021 appears to be a critical year for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Internally, the organisation has been slow to address the coup in Myanmar, anti-government protests in Thailand, and political turmoil in Malaysia.1 All this against the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic, which continues to infect thousands across the region. Externally, the situation is even more fractured, as the member states begin pursuing foreign policies to their own timeframes and agendas. In reviewing these bleak realities, many critics have questioned the efficacy of the so-called “ASEAN Way”, a series of principles that emphasize regional cooperation, consensus-building, and consultation.2 

With regards to foreign policy, these principles represent a “middle path”; one which strives for independence from great-power dominance. This doctrine is enshrined in the 1971 Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), in which the member states committed themselves to keep the region “free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers”.3 ASEAN continues to walk this geopolitical tightrope, balancing between the influence of an established superpower in the US and a rising one in China. Thus far, effective diplomacy and internal unity have facilitated this maintenance of independence, whilst contributing to the strengthening of ties with other great powers.4 

In the past decade, the tightrope has become harder to walk on, as Beijing and Washington continue to vie for greater influence in the Indo-Pacific. The cherished ZOPFAN principles are being called into question, and it seems time for ASEAN to select a superpower to side with.5 Such a stance utilises realist arguments, claiming that Sino-American competition has reached a point where complete cooperation with one side is imperative for ASEAN’s future prosperity.6 This essay argues the opposite: that neutrality remains the best option not just for ASEAN but for all the great powers with interests in the region. 

The Need for Consensus 

The critics are right about one aspect: ASEAN must refocus its efforts in uniting the voices of its member states if it is to recover rapidly from the pandemic. Without the presence of custodian states - akin to the role played by France and Germany within the EU - to initiate dialogue, the organisation must prioritise its agenda for reaching common ground on the problems caused by the pandemic before looking outwards. 

This is not an impossible task. On July 19 the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights issued a joint statement calling on Malaysia and Thailand to include migrant workers in their Covid response policies, indicating the organisation’s ability to criticise its constituents' internal actions.7 To be certain, such willingness is much harder to achieve in foreign policy, with each state possessing its own interests and goals. Recent divergences in the member states’ interactions with China over the South China Sea dispute have made this clear, and the recent US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan also raises concerns about Washington’s commitment to ASEAN.8 

Yet for both superpowers, what ASEAN lacks as a tool to progress their respective agendas in the region, it more than makes up for by serving as a vehicle for economic cooperation and political dialogue. Far from being a self-serving organisation, it has spawned a wealth of other extra-region wide initiatives; bridging the gap between not only the superpowers but also between key players in the Asia-Pacific.9 For all its faults, ASEAN has managed to facilitate a level of regional cooperation which has enabled the free exchange of goods, ideas, and cultures on a scale surpassed only by the EU.10 Washington and Beijing must come to realise the value of such a platform and partake fully in this “ecosystem of peace” as Mahbubani and Sng term it, especially given the immense value that ASEAN-born infrastructure can provide to Covid relief efforts.11 Were ASEAN to side firmly with one power, it would likely result in the other’s reluctance to remain highly involved in the extra-regional platforms. Thus, though ASEAN may 

The Need for Consensus 

The critics are right about one aspect: ASEAN must refocus its efforts in uniting the voices of its member states if it is to recover rapidly from the pandemic. Without the presence of custodian states - akin to the role played by France and Germany within the EU - to initiate dialogue, the organisation must prioritise its agenda for reaching common ground on the problems caused by the pandemic before looking outwards. 

This is not an impossible task. On July 19 the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights issued a joint statement calling on Malaysia and Thailand to include migrant workers in their Covid response policies, indicating the organisation’s ability to criticise its constituents' internal actions.7 To be certain, such willingness is much harder to achieve in foreign policy, with each state possessing its own interests and goals. Recent divergences in the member states’ interactions with China over the South China Sea dispute have made this clear, and the recent US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan also raises concerns about Washington’s commitment to ASEAN.8 

Yet for both superpowers, what ASEAN lacks as a tool to progress their respective agendas in the region, it more than makes up for by serving as a vehicle for economic cooperation and political dialogue. Far from being a self-serving organisation, it has spawned a wealth of other extra-region-wide initiatives; bridging the gap between not only the superpowers but also between key players in the Asia-Pacific.9 For all its faults, ASEAN has managed to facilitate a level of regional cooperation that has enabled the free exchange of goods, ideas, and cultures on a scale surpassed only by the EU.10 Washington and Beijing must come to realise the value of such a platform and partake fully in this “ecosystem of peace” as Mahbubani and Sng term it, especially given the immense value that ASEAN-born infrastructure can provide to Covid relief efforts.11 Were ASEAN to side firmly with one power, it would likely result in the other’s reluctance to remain highly involved in the extra-regional platforms. Thus, though ASEAN may be relegated to serving merely as a neutral middleman for the two superpowers, a neutral organisation is preferable to a biased one. 

Other Great Powers 

The second problem with arguments calling for a departure from the ASEAN Way is that they imply a bipolar regional order: the US and China are portrayed as rival superpowers in the same way the US and USSR were perceived during the first decade of ASEAN’s existence.12 Whilst it is undeniable that the two are the major actors, and thus the two extremes which the middle path runs between, other nations have recently emerged as key players with their own stakes in the region. These include Japan, South Korea, India, the EU, and the UK.13 

In a post-covid world, ASEAN should focus its immediate foreign policy on building ties with these partners, as doing so will invite those nations to further their participation in the extra-regional forums and economic agreements which have already benefited the community.14 Taken from a standpoint of realpolitik, these efforts will also work to dissuade the superpowers from attempting to hold greater sway over ASEAN, as such policies will be met with greater opposition from the new stakeholders. 

Conclusion 

At the founding meeting of ASEAN in 1967, Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam presciently remarked on the need for unity within the organisation: “if we do not hang together, we of the ASEAN nations will hang separately”.15 His words still resonate today. As the member states continue to grapple with their own socioeconomic and political difficulties during the pandemic, and as questions arise over just how neutral the organization can remain, the ASEAN way seems an idealistic philosophy of a bygone age. 

In his article for the Foreign Policy Institute, Felix Chang concludes that “searching [for a third way] does not mean finding”.16Indeed, ASEAN may never truly find the perfect geopolitical strategy vis-a-vis the US and China, but with new stakeholders looking to benefit from the networks it has created, and with superpower tensions rising, the organisation should re-emphasise to all that maintaining the middle path for a post-covid world is the most beneficial policy for recovery and regional prosperity. 

1 The question of ASEAN’s response to Myanmar is analysed in Sebastian Strangio, “Can ASEAN’s Special Envoy Resolve the Crisis in Myanmar?” The Diplomat, August 5, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2 021/08/can -aseans-special-envoy-resolve-the-crisis-in-myanmar/. ASEAN has not voiced any united opinion of events in Thailand and Malaysia at the time of writing.

2 Felix K. Chang, “ASEAN’s Search for a Third Way: Southeast Asia’s Relations with China and the United States,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, The Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 17, 2021, https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/06/aseans-search-for-a-third-way-southeast-asias-relations-with-china-an d-the-united-states/. 

3 ASEAN, “Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality,” legal document, Kuala Lumpur, 1971. 

4 The rapid expansion of dialogue partners to ASEAN is indicative of this stability. Before the fall of the USSR this included Australia (1974); New Zealand (1975); Canada, Japan, and the EU (1977); South Korea (1991). Sourced from Mahbubani and Sng, The ASEAN Miracle, 68. 

5 Arguments which follow this line include Toru Takahashi, “Subtle Threat to ASEAN: US Indifference to Indonesia and Thailand,” Nikkei Asia, August 11, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Interna tional-relations/ Biden-s-Asia-policy/Subtle-threat-to-ASEAN-US-indifference-to-Indonesia-and-Thailand/.; see also Laura Southgate, “Trump, Biden, and the Obstacles to ASEAN Neutrality,” The Diplomat, November 25, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/trump-biden-and-the-obstacles-to-asean neutrality/.; for a discussion on the stance argued in this essay, see Eileen Ng, “Asean needs to stay neutral amid US-China tensions: Tommy Koh,” The Straits Times, May 26, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/asean-needs-to-stay-neutral-and-united-amid-us-china-tensions -tommy-koh. 

6 For a critique on the theoretical lenses which can be used to view the situation see Cheong Kee Cheok and Yong Chen Chen,“Assessing ASEAN’s Relevance: Have the Right Questions Been Asked?” Journal of Southeast Asian Economics 36, no. 1 (2019); 12-24.  

7 ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, “To Tackle COVID-19 Outbreaks, ASEAN MPs Call for More Inclusive Policies for Migrant Workers.” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights. ASEAN, July 19, 2021. https://aseanmp.org/2021/07/19/to-tackle-covid-19-outbreaks-asean-mps-call-for-more-inclusiv e-policie s-of-migrant-workers/.

8 For a detailed overview of events regarding the South China Sea dispute, see Felix Chang, “ASEAN’s Search for a Third Way,” The Foreign Policy Institute; China’s own diplomatic talks with the Taliban following the US-NATO withdrawal are also being closely followed, see Stuart Lau, “China’s 47-Mile Long Problem with the Taliban,” Politico, Politico, August 18, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/chinas-47-mil e-long-problem-with-the-taliban/. 

9 These include the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), ARF (ASEA Regional Forum), ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea), and the EAS (East Asia Summit), sourced from Mahbubani and Sng, The ASEAN Miracle, p. 75; of particular note with regards to superpower presence and policy vis-a-vis ASEAN are the Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) which the US has been noticeably less inclined to take part in over recent years; see Laura Southgate, “Trump, Biden, and the Obstacles to ASEAN neutrality”, The Diplomat. 

10 Mahbubani and Sng, The ASEAN Miracle: 112-121. 

11 A recent example of this was the sharing of lessons on covid surveillance between ASEAN and its East Asian partners; “ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, Epidemiology Experts Share Disease Surveillance Experiences on Covid-19,” ASEAN Portal for Public Health Emergencies, ASEAN Secretariat, June 1, 2020, https://aseanphe.org/asean-china-japan-korea-epidemiology-experts-share-disease-surveillance-e xperiences-on-covid-19/. 

12 Following the Sino-Soviet Split during the 1960s, Beijing replaced Moscow as the rival to the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Mahbubani and Sng, The ASEAN Miracle, p. 97-100.

13 Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, “UK becomes Dialogue Partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” GOV.UK, GOV.UK, August 5, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-b ecomes-dialogue-partner-of-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations. 

14 R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, “The Expansion of ASEAN and the Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 39 no. 2 (2017), 232-238; for a more recent assessment on ASEAN’s economic achievements see Koichi Ishikawa, “The ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN economic integration,” Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies, Vol. 10, no. 1. (2021), https://www.tandfonline .com /doi/full/10.1080 /24761028.2021.1891702; a more holistic appraisal is considered in Dr. Fatima Sta. Maria, “ASEAN Economic Integration: Myth or Reality,” (lecture, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore, January 22, 2018). 

15 Quoted in Mahbubani and Sng, The ASEAN Miracle, p. 53. 

16 Felix Chang, “ASEAN’s Search for a Third Way,” The Foreign Policy Institute. 

Works Cited: 

  1. ASEAN, “Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.” Legal document, Kuala Lumpur,1971.Accessed August 21,2021. http://planning.nida.ac.th/main/images/Planning%20Division/ASEAN/Declaration_on_the_Zone_of_Peace_Freedom_and_Neutrality_-_ZOPFAN.pdf 

  2. “ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, Epidemiology Experts Share Disease Surveillance Experiences on Covid-19 .” ASEAN Portal for Public Health Emergencies. ASEAN Secretariat, June 1, 2020. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://aseanphe.org/asean-china-japan-korea-epidemiology-ex perts-share-disease-surveillance-experiences-on-covid-19/. 

  3. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human rights. “To Tackle COVID-19 Outbreaks, ASEAN MPs Call for More Inclusive Policies for Migrant Workers.” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights. ASEAN, July 19, 2021. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://aseanmp.org/2021/07/19/to-tackle-cov id-19-outbreaks-asean-mps-call-for-more-inclusive-policies-of-migrant-workers/. 

  4. Chang, Felix K. “ASEAN's Search for a Third Way: Southeast Asia's Relations with China and the United States.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 8, 2021. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/06/aseans-search-for-a-third-way-so utheast-asias-relations-with-china-and-the-united-states/. 

  5. Cheok, Cheong Kee, and Yong Chen Chen, “Assessing ASEAN’s Relevance: Have the Right Questions Been Asked?” Journal of Southeast Asian Economics 36, no. 1 (2019): 11-24. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664250. 

  6. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. “UK Becomes Dialogue Partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.” GOV.UK. GOV.UK, August 5, 2021. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-becomes-dialogue-partner-of-the-associat ion-of-southeast-asian-nations.

  7. Ishikawa, Koichi. “The ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN economic integration.” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies vol. 10, no. 1 (2021): 24-41. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://www.tand fonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2021.1891702. 

  8. Lau, Stuart. “China's 47-Mile-Long Problem with the Taliban.” POLITICO. POLITICO, August 18, 2021. https://www.politico.eu/article/chinas-47-mile-long-problem-with-the-taliban/. Mahbubani, Kishore, and Sng, Jeffrey, The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace. Singapore: NUS Press, 2017. 

  9. Natalegawa, R.M. Marty M., "The Expansion of ASEAN and the Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asia." Contemporary Southeast Asia 39, no. 2 (2017): 232-38. Accessed August 21, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44683763. 

  10. Ng, Eileen. “Asean needs to stay neutral and united amid US-China tensions: Tommy Koh.” The Straits Times, Singapore Press Holdings, May 26, 2021. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://www.straitsti mes.com/asia/se-asia/asean-needs-to-stay-neutral-and-united-amid-us-china-tensions-tommy-koh. 

  11. Strangio, Sebastian. “Can ASEAN's Special Envoy Resolve the Crisis in Myanmar?” The Diplomat. The Diplomat, August 5, 2021. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/can- -aseans-special-envoy- resolve-the-crisis-in-myanmar/. 

  12. Southgate, Laura. “Trump, Biden, and the Obstacles to ASEAN Neutrality.” The Diplomat. The Diplomat, November 25, 2020. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/trum p-biden-and-the-obstacles-to-asean-neutrality/. 

  13. Takahashi, Toru. “Subtle Threat to ASEAN: US Indifference to Indonesia and Thailand.” Nikkei Asia. Nikkei Asia, August 11, 2021. Accessed August 21, 2021. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Interna tional-relations/Biden-s-Asia-policy/Subtle-threat-to-ASEAN-US-indifference-to-Indonesia-and Thailand/.

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