The Russia-Ukraine War: A Latin American Perspective
The commencement of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine on the 24th of February of this year was quick to receive condemnation throughout the world. On the 2nd of March the UN General Assembly would see 141 out of the 193 UN Member States vote in favour of a resolution demanding the immediate end to the conflict. Yet despite such widespread condemnation, the world is very much divided on how best to approach the situation in order to achieve peace as soon as possible. While the West has pursued significant actions like that of unilateral sanctions, the removal of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, and the supplying of weapons to assist Ukraine’s military in the conflict - the vast majority of countries outside of the West, such as those within Latin America, have not followed suit, and many have instead moved to criticise such measures, especially the use of ‘indiscriminate sanctions’. Such a situation has then begged the question as to why this variation in responding to the crisis exists.
While US President Joe Biden has boasted that Russia is increasingly ‘isolated from the world’, we are presented with a very different picture when turning to look at other regions, especially developing ones. Latin America, for one, provides a most informative case in understanding how the crisis in Ukraine has prompted such an alternative response amongst developing states compared to that of the West, in which these states have chosen to not isolate Russia through the use of measures like that of implementing sanctions, for many rely on Russia for core economic sectors, most significantly in agriculture. Thus, through understanding the circumstances which inform the reaction of these Latin American states, we are more able to fully realise what the profound impact of the measures taken and encouraged by the West will have on these states. From this, the West must then carefully address these concerns, for continuing to be ignorant on this matter risks both fermenting further animosity against the West’s position on the crisis as well as risking the creation of a much more severe global crisis.
Since the start of the crisis in late February, Latin America has been very much disunited in their narrative response. Such would be clearly exemplified during the process of suspending Russia from the UNHCR, which saw Honduras, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Ecuador vote in favour, Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia vote against, and Brazil, Mexico and El Salvador abstaining. The region would further experience such division, with states like Colombia, who saw its outgoing President Iván Duque Márquez directly condemning Russia for its “premeditated and unjustified attack”, while those like Brazil would emphasise its “impartiality” on the matter while also supporting the presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin at this year’s G20 Summit in November, despite Western calls to block him.
As expressed by Argentinian foreign policy expert Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Latin America has faced a ‘dramatic fragmentation’ when it comes to the rhetoric of their response to the conflict, unlike the unified narrative we see in the likes of Europe or the US. However, when it comes to the matter of sanctions, Latin America is in some regard unofficially united - no Latin American state has imposed sanctions against Russia, and has often instead criticised the West for its use. In March, Argentina’s Foreign Minister Santiago Cafiero would argue that the use of sanctions would not be efficient in achieving peace, with this perspective being promoted further with Brazil in May attempting to pass an amendment on a UN resolution which highlighted the negative impacts of sanctions on the global food supply, though ultimately vetoed by the US.
Such reflects the circumstances in which much of Latin America finds itself in, with economic, political and ideological factors all contributing to an adherence to not isolating Russia, for the consequences of doing so would be greatly problematic for each state.
In the economic sphere, Russia’s relationship with the region should not be underestimated. Latin America and Russia have long been building economic ties which have seen significant investments by Russia, with a significant presence in a variety of sectors - one of the most critical being in agribusiness. For many Latin American states, economic relations with Russia are essential due to a high dependency on Russian fertiliser required for their agribusiness sectors. Brazil, for one, who is the largest producer and exporter of products like soybeans, must import 85% of its fertiliser, with 23% coming from Russia. Other states like Peru, which has seen fruit exports to Russia increase by 28% annually in the past 5 years, relies on Russia for over 50% of its fertiliser. With this dependency, there is a real fear that the impact of sanctions on fertiliser prices could be detrimental to these sectors' production. Peruvian agrarian economist and researcher at the Group for the Analysis of Development (GRADE) think tank, Eduardo Zegarra, would state in late April that Peru was at risk of seeing a 40% decrease in the output of staple foods like rice and corn, potentially worsening the already precarious global food situation.
As a result, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay would come together to ensure that fertiliser products would be excluded from sanctions - submitting such a proposal to the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation in early March. Yet in spite of such, the sanctions already imposed by Western states have indirectly disrupted the supply chain, and the US alone is expected to see the price for fertiliser increase by 12%, a situation which has a significantly more severe consequence for many in Latin America which lack financial resources. Considering this alongside the severe fuel shortages has also meant that due to the increased cost to transport food, food prices have subsequently increased - puting profound pressure on households who even by the end of 2021, saw 40% of their income utilised for food and energy expenses.
In this context, Latin American governments are in a precarious situation which deeply influences their responses to the conflict. With the simultaneous threat of a global food shortage and economies still recovering from the pandemic, governments across the region have little flexibility - though still each state faces these crises in a variety of circumstances. Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro faces an upcoming election in October, and with his opponent former-President Luiz Inacio Lula leading him in the polls by 14%, he cannot afford to damage relations with Russia and thus threatening the Brazilian economy which is still recovering from the pandemic. The states of Cuba and Venezuela, both sanctioned by the US, still heavily rely on Russian support in order to operate. Cuba, for example, would see its debt repayment US$2.3 billion in loans from Russia be postponed in February until 2027.
In other states, like that of Mexico, the reasoning for its neutrality and focus on calling for a negotiated-peace rather than sanctions is much more ideological, though still with economic undertones. Under the current President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Mexico has subscribed to what is known as the ‘Estrada Doctrine’ which effectively commits the nation to a policy of non-intervention and a focus on respecting state sovereignty. Such has led to AMLO opposing the Western strategy of sanctions and supplying weapons to Ukraine which only risks prolonging the conflict, and thus Mexico continues to communicate with Russia and instead focusing on providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
These responses and circumstances in which Latin America, and in fact all developing states, operate should be closely examined and kept in mind by policy makers within the West. So far the EU, US, and its allies have imposed sanctions even at the detriment of their own populations. Alongside an increase in gas prices, several states in the West are facing a ‘cost-of-living’ crisis, with the Bank of England of the UK, for example, expecting the British economy to fall into recession this year. The shock to the global economic system as a result of the sanctions has had a fundamental impact on all, but such an impact will be unevenly distributed. Developing states, who lack much of the flexibility in relation to financial resources, will suffer the most from these crises if nothing is done to remedy the situation.
If the West continues to approach the situation as it has done for the last three months, and continues to fail to consider the overarching impact that their actions have on those outside of Europe, then it risks undermining its own position no matter how noble they perceive it. Those, like the US especially, must realise that it cannot solely prioritise the provision of funding to Ukraine and utilisation of sanctions against Russia if it has any hope of achieving peace in the conflict, at least not without significantly damaging its standing. Already, with US$40 billion scheduled to be sent by the US to Ukraine, it has been made apparent how willing the US is to provide war support in comparison to providing any sort of alleviation to developing states. ASEAN, for instance, an organisation of ten member states, was promised only US$150 million for new projects.
Nonetheless, there is much to gain in attempting to understand the ramifications of the conflict through an alternative, Latin American, and developing lens. In permitting ourselves to empathise with the oncoming crises facing those like these Latin American states, the West may better adjust their approach in responding to the conflict in a way which both achieves peace in Ukraine and minimises the consequences resulting from the actions that have taken place. Such is a much better strategy than prolonging the conflict through currently stagnated tactics which instead risks generating an even more severe global crises in the future - which, as often is the case, will see the people of the developing world suffer much more.
Aidan Cross